

RESPONSE RESILIENCE PREPAREDNESS

Lessons from Christian Aid's
Yolanda Response and
Resilience Programme



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Partners Who Led Typhoon Haiyan Response Programme

Action for Economic Reforms (AER)
Alyansa Tigil Mina (ATM)
Caucus of Development NGO Networks (CODE NGO)
Community Crafts Association of the Philippines
Coastal Core, Inc. (CCI)
Leading in Cleaning Initiatives (LCI)
Center for Empowerment and Resource Development (CERD)
Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ)
Disaster Risk Reduction Network Philippines (DRRNet Philippines)
Ecosystems Work for Essential Benefits (ECOWEB)
Fellowship for Organizing Endeavors (FORGE)
Iloilo Caucus of Development NGOs (ICODE)
Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment through Alternative Legal Services (IDEALS)
Institute for Climate and Sustainable Cities (ICSC)
Management of Organizational Development for Empowerment (MODE)
Manila Observatory (MO)
National Council of Churches in the Philippines (NCCP)
NGOs for Fisheries Reform (NFR)
Palawan Advocates for Good Governance and Empowerment (PAGE)
Pambansang Koalisyon ng Kababaihan sa Kanayunan (PKKK)
Panay Rural Development Center, Inc. (PRDCI)
Partnership of Philippine Support Service Agencies (PHILSSA)
People's Disaster Risk Reduction Network (PDRRN)
Philippine Network of Rural Democratization and Development (PHILNET-RDD)
Rice Watch and Action Network Philippines (RWAN)
Shared Aid Fund for Emergency Response (SAFER)
Sentro Para sa Ikaunlad ng Katutubong Agham at Teknolohiya (SIKAT)
Social Watch Philippines (SWP)
Socio-Pastoral Institute (SPI)
Technical Assistance Organization-Pilipinas (TAO-Pilipinas)
The Samdhana Institute (Samdhana)
University of the Philippines Visayas Foundation, Inc. (UPVFI)
Urban Poor Associates (UPA)
Visayas State University (VSU)
Women's Legal and Human Rights Bureau (WLB)
Zoological Society of London (ZSL)

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Christian Aid (CA) in the Philippines responded to the impact of super typhoon Haiyan to affected households and communities through its Yolanda Response and Resilience Programme (YRRP).

Lessons learned on YRRP were drawn from a report commissioned by Christian Aid titled “Response, Resilience, Preparedness Meta Review of Christian Aid’s Yolanda Response and Resilience Programme Experience in the Philippines.”



Relief and Early Recovery Phase

- to meet the immediate food, non-food, and shelter needs of affected households and communities, and provide livelihood interventions to jumpstart early recovery;



Rehabilitation and Resilience-Building Phase

- to rebuild lives, livelihoods, and assets by strengthening capacities and decreasing vulnerabilities of households, communities, and local organisations to disasters; and,



Exit Phase - to complete the area-based rehabilitation and resilience projects and put in place mechanisms to increase the likelihood of sustaining programme impacts.

CA and partners reflected on the lessons learned on YRRP’s implementation from November 2013 to March 2018 to improve future responses and share good practices.

Documentation of the lessons was derived from a joint learning workshop using the Critical Moments learning methodology. Unlike development programming and/or humanitarian programming where the formulation of the theory of change (ToC) precedes practice, the lesson-learning workshop was a retrospective exercise that derives theory from practice. The purpose is to capitalize on and optimize the value of success stories by transforming implicit knowledge of implementing agents, beneficiaries, and other stakeholders to explicit knowledge that can be shared and tested elsewhere.

A series of workshops and interviews with beneficiaries, partners, and Christian Aid staff was conducted to identify and shortlist success stories, examine success factors, and describe good practices and conditions for replication and/or scaling up.

The review team further processed case-based success stories and reclustered them into seven programme-based narratives, herein described as the Seven Theses from the Yolanda Rehabilitation and Resilience Programme.

The Seven Theses

Thesis 1

During a large-scale crisis, disaster-affected families in rural areas can secure use rights for home lots and public facilities on private land through third-party facilitated negotiations with landowners.



This lesson is derived from the shelter response experience of TAO (Manicani Island, Eastern Samar), UPA (Tacloban City), PhilNet (Ormoc), and iCODE (Iloilo); and the WASH experience of PHILSSA/PAGE (Busuanga) and UPVI (Gigantes Island) where the precondition for provision of permanent shelters and public-use WASH facilities was access to land and where government was not prepared to allocate land for housing.

“The experience shows that during a crisis, affected families could bank on the humanism of landowners and negotiate usufruct rights with facilitation by responders.”

The process also highlights collaboration among responders in the provision of technical support for preparing the legal documents. The duration of usufruct rights ranges from 2-3 years renewable (Tacloban), 15 years (Iloilo), open-ended (Eastern Samar), and 40 years for the water system in Gigantes Island. The usufruct agreements benefitted 181 families in Iloilo and 42 in Manicani.

“The usufruct agreements benefitted 181 families in Iloilo and 42 in Manicani.”

The ‘Why’ Question

Why do landowners agree to relinquish use rights to portions of their private land at no cost to shelter beneficiaries?







Explanatory Factors

- Humanist concern for others in times of urgent need and the opportunity for landowners to associate themselves with the programme goals
- Kinship by blood between the landowner and the beneficiary
- Availability of space and the landowner has no immediate use of that space within his/her property
- Absence of external (and speculative) investments that jack up the price of land
- Availability of facilitating agents that provide financial, technical, and legal support.
- Incentive. On shelter, the landowner benefits from the expression of gratitude bestowed on him/her and the beneficiary gains power in acquiring a new asset.





Interplay of Processes

 Political	 Economic	 Technical	 Social
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dialogue between shelter beneficiaries and landowner mediated by CA partner; or dialogue between private landowner and CA partner in behalf of the beneficiaries. • Negotiation on terms and conditions (spatial and temporal limits of usufruct rights) • Signifying of agreement and/or affidavits of undertaking • In Tacloban City, Sangguniang Panglunsod Resolution allowing the construction of temporary shelters in NBZs • Community organizing: establishment of the homeowners' association (HOA) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mobilization of beneficiary counterpart resources for production • Securing basic food needs from production outputs • Allocating marketable surplus for income generation • Integration to subsector value chain system • Re-investments (production, house repairs, education, health needs) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Selection of beneficiaries • Participatory of design of shelters • Assessments (structural, geological) • Securing adherence to SPHERE standards, build-back better principles and state regulatory requirements • Dialogues and negotiations to secure land tenure rights • Securing legal requirements and permits • Trainings (e.g. procurement) • Procurement of materials and services (local builders/contractors) • Shelter construction (experts of CA partners provide technical supervision) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interaction between men and women and reallocation of productive and reproductive roles • Interaction among women and decision to norm and form women-led enterprises 

Thesis 2

Livelihood recovery varies in form and substance, depending on commodity line, abundance, access and control of the resource base, capacity of users of livelihood assistance, form of organization, and quality of integration to the value chain system.



“Based on the experience and actual results, it is argued there is no linear relationship between livelihood recovery and the type of livelihood assistance provided. Corollary to this argument is the evidence that increased income is not a solid indicator of livelihood recovery.”

The livelihood recovery narrative of the YRRP is characterized by the dominance of positive results with pockets of failures and difficulties on certain types of livelihoods and commodity lines.

In the review of the DFID-funded Rapid Emergency Assistance to Typhoon Haiyan-affected Communities and Vulnerable Groups in Eastern Samar, Leyte and Palawan Through Cash Programming Linked to Livelihood Restoration, Logarta et.al. (2015) found

that livelihoods which showed initial signs of success were not necessarily attributable to the PHP 5,000 livelihood assistance especially under conditions where beneficiaries had other unmet basic needs.

CA partners also provided proximate opportunities that cushioned the costs of individual or household production. Even communities have their own safety nets not only for emergencies but also for production. In Basey, producers of rice and vegetables could lean on traditional credit schemes called *pahulod* or *palangoy* from better-off neighbors as cost-reduction measure capital borrowing. In Iloilo and Leyte, cost-reduction strategies introduced by PhilNet and PRDCI (such as organic fertilizer production and organic farming) eased financial burdens in production.

The ‘Why’ Question






In livelihood recovery from disaster, why do beneficiaries succeed while others fail?

Explanatory Factors

- Increased capacities (e.g. production, financial management, value chain integration) and availability of capacity development providers. CA long-term partners and YRRP implementers provided technical support in sustainable agriculture and organic farming (PhilNet, PRDCI), early warning (RWAN), or outsourcing of training for financial management (PHILSSA/PAGE)
- Access and control of resources (e.g. agricultural land, fishing grounds, raw materials for handicraft production). In Basey, women weavers and network members of PKKK regained post-disaster control of tikog (*Fimbristylis globulosa*) alongside rice production or replanting in wetlands. In Busuanga, women weavers have access to naturally-grown and abundant bamboo
- Cost and risk reduction support— either in the form of quick, simple and non-usurious credit from savings-and-loans associations, shifting to organic production, access to post-harvest facilities and extension services

- Integration to subsector value chains. The most prominent examples are the women weavers of Basey (tikog) and Busuanga (bamboo) where their crafts extend to export markets through intermediary organizations
- Diversification of income sources. This is not only a strategy for risk reduction but also a strategy of optimizing household labor (skills and capacities) and seizing opportunities offered by other economic sectors and subsectors
- Beneficial ownership of the means of production and outputs of labor which engenders productivity and economic power
- Favorable market environments. Agriculture and fisheries outputs are largely perishable and susceptible to fluctuations in demand and price. The positive trends in fisheries income in Busuanga, for example, have been influenced by tourism and high demand for fishes in hotels and restaurants

Interplay of Processes

 <p>Political</p>	 <p>Economic</p>	 <p>Technical</p>	 <p>Social</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Beneficiary decision on livelihood options, including diversification • Intra-household allocation of tasks between men and women • Norming and forming of enterprise organizations and corresponding decision-making processes • Collectivizing economic interests and raising voice 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mobilization of beneficiary counterpart resources for production • Securing basic food needs from production outputs • Allocating marketable surplus for income generation • Integration to subsector value chain system • Re-investments (production, house repairs, education, health needs) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mapping through consultations: priority beneficiaries and priority livelihood options • Distribution of start-up capital and/or equipment • Trainings • Introduction of technology (models) • Production, value addition, value chain integration • Advocacy for government support 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interaction between men and women and reallocation of productive and reproductive roles • Interaction among women and decision to norm and form women-led enterprises 



Thesis 3

Small islands have specific characteristics and island communities have specific needs that require special attention. Traditional exclusion and marginalization can be overcome through appropriate interventions.

This lesson is derived from the UPVFI experience in Gigantes Islands off the coast of Iloilo province. The group of islands (12 islets) was largely unknown before Yolanda. Eighty percent of families are poor and are informally occupying lands without secure ownership rights. They have been traditionally excluded from mainland planning and infrastructure development. With little preparedness, Typhoon Yolanda impacted on pre-existing economic deprivation, physical isolation, informal settlements in danger zones, and scarcity of essential services. Due to isolation and lack of communication, they would not have been given immediate special attention in humanitarian aid.

“Through UPVFI, the YRRP not only responded to the humanitarian crisis but ultimately incorporated the Gigantes Islands to mainland planning, political processes and structures.”

The ‘Why’ Question

Communities in small and far off islands are often unheard of in the daily life of the nation and are traditionally excluded. The intuitive answers to

why they are excluded ranges from isolation and lack of communication, sparse populations that are perceived to be insignificant to the electoral victory or defeat of politicians, and low revenues that do not justify the cost of service delivery and infrastructure development. The counter-intuition of YRRP was to argue that small islands should not be excluded, especially during emergencies.

Explanatory Factors


The successful effort to incorporate the small islands into mainland plans, processes and structures could be attributed to the following factors:

- Utilization of the small island lens in the implementation of YRRP and the purposive decision to give special attention to the small islanders in Gigantes
- Science-based understanding of risks in aid of planning and capacity development
- Multi-stakeholder and multi-level cooperation that reached out to provincial and regional agencies of government
- Community organizing and capacity development to increase and strengthen the voice of small islanders





Interplay of Processes



Thesis 4

There is no resilience without power in the hands of the affected peoples. During emergencies, power dynamics shift due to sudden disequilibrium of capacities and resources. It is important for responders and affected communities to navigate the power dynamics to restore equilibrium at the household, community, and societal level.



Poverty, inequality, and vulnerability are interconnected. Not only does the relationship between them create disproportionate exposure to risks and corresponding depth of consequences, it also creates disequilibrium of power that limits the ability of the affected to participate in decisions affecting their lives or to make their own decisions.

The YRRP veered away from conventional humanitarian thinking and embedded elements of community voice and empowerment where organizing and capacity development played important roles.

The 'Why' Question

Why do disaster-affected peoples need power to enhance resilience? Is the replacement value of lost resources provided by humanitarian agencies not sufficient? Is capacity building not enough to disturb the disequilibrium of power relations?

Explanatory Factors







It is one thing to adapt to changes in context. Changing the context itself is another. But the two are intertwined. The biggest unfairness in the climate change and disaster arenas is when the small are asked to adapt because the big players are unwilling to change ways and mitigate climate change.

- Informal settlers in urban areas and coastal zones are exposed to risks and highly vulnerable to disasters and dips in means of survival. While housing needs may be met through resettlement,

they face the risk of losing urban-based livelihoods and sources of income. In the experience of UPA in Tacloban, informal settlers in the coastal zones of the city gained power to remain where they are while pursuing in-city resettlement. They do not just adapt to national government decisions on the resettlement of Yolanda victims. They exercise power to influence change in the housing and land tenure contexts in urban areas, inclusive of barring the full implementation of the NBZ policy of government.

- Women weavers used to work for employers and/or financiers. When women weavers in Basey and Busuanga decided to move away from wage income and assume control of time and means of production and own and manage the enterprise, it was not mainly an adaptation to dips in income in the aftermath of Yolanda. It is a conscious and proactive decision to take power and change the context of the sub-sector.
- In the YRRP experience, restoration of material losses, capacity building and development of technical innovations are not sufficient. These resources have to be converted to power to participate in decision making and/or make own decisions.

Interplay of Processes

 Political	 Economic	 Technical	 Social
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mapping of political actors and force field analysis; mapping reform paths • Self-organization and collectivization of political and other interests • Accessing information (with support from partners through advocacy and research) • Addressing barriers, threats, and opportunities (advocacy, resistance to adverse policies and programs) • Women: carving political space, raising voice and demonstrating leadership 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Household level: reallocation of economic outputs (subsistence needs and marketable surplus); allocation of revenues (consumption and reinvestments) • Norming and forming of group-based enterprises (developing the incentive structure for individual participation in groups) • Integration to subsector value chain system 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rapid assessment of disaster impacts • DRR: detailed assessment using PVCA tool and DRR planning • Livelihoods: mapping of priority livelihood options and beneficiaries • Political: community organizing • Capacity building • Provision of facilitating factors: post-harvest facilities, value addition, value chain integration, generation of government support 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Household level: reallocation of reproductive and productive roles between men and women • Community level: women carving space in decision making and ownership and control of production and income; men recognizing the leadership of women in certain economic activities 



Thesis 5

Community organizing enhances the replacement value of humanitarian assistance and helps secure the achievement of strategic development needs.



When big disasters occur especially on an intensity and scale such as Typhoon Yolanda, the assumption is that, aside from material losses, affected families and communities become disorganized and the mechanisms and institutions around them become dysfunctional. Indeed, Yolanda has created dysfunctions of community organizations and even local governments necessitating the take-over role of national government, UN HCT, and international humanitarian agencies in emergency response and early recovery. The images were that of a humanitarian agency crowd serving the herd of helpless victims in evacuation centers. Weeks after Yolanda, the dysfunction of the local government of Tacloban City could be gleaned from the takeover role of hard-hat, wage-paid and uniformed garbage collectors paid for by a UN agency.

“Organizing enhances the replacement value of humanitarian aid by empowering the affected to think beyond relief and use humanitarian aid as a resource for strategic development needs.”

Relief assistance does not fully replace lost values. Disaster assessments fall short of estimating higher order losses such as lost opportunities, loss of lives, or disruption of relationships and social networks.

Community-based organizations have multiple functions. In the relief phase, they facilitated rapid assessments and identification of the most vulnerable. In the rehabilitation and resilience phase,

they represented voice of the affected, served as transmission points for delivery of assistance, and became a mechanism for claiming rights around shelter, accountable governance, livelihood support, and access to essential services.





The ‘Why’ Question

Why is there a need for community organizing even under humanitarian settings? Why did YRRP deviate from conventional humanitarian aid delivery that shuns community organizing (and capacity building)?

Explanatory Factors

- Responders have pre-existing presence in the affected areas and relationships with existing organizations and/or community leaders
- At the programme level, community organizing was embedded as a strategy and recognized as necessary instrument for strengthening the power dimension of resilience
- For responders, community organizations served as the most efficient mechanism for context-specific rapid assessments, identification of the most vulnerable sectors, prioritization of beneficiaries, and management of tensions and conflicts
- At the community level, it is an instrument for collectivizing agendas and pooling resources. Individuals and families are less ignored political institutions if they are organized. Community grievances are better heard if articulated by an organized force

Interplay of Processes

 Political	 Economic	 Technical	 Social
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Norming and forming of base organizations • Collectivizing agendas • Expanding voice through federation building • Advocacy (with support of CA partners) • Individual choice on which organization/s to join or which livelihood option/s to take • Group choice on which political actions to take or which group-based enterprise to undertake • Individual and community decision on contributions to operations and maintenance of WASH facilities • Establishment of mechanisms for engagements with LGUs and national government agencies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Building the economic power of individuals (men and women) through production, value addition, and integration to subsector value chains • Building the economic power of self-help groups based on choice of enterprises (e.g. savings and credit, rice retailing, supply of fertilizer, supply of animal feed, weaving) • Raising voice for economic support services from government • Family decision on use of production output (consumption, trading) • Family decision on re-allocation of revenues (e.g. house repairs, education, etc.) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identification of target community • Contact meeting survivors • Consultation and rapid assessment • Identification of potential leaders • Application of the “CO” process towards forming of the structure and election of leaders • Formation of the “samahan” (association). For beneficiaries of shelter assistance, formation of Homeowners Association (HOA); for beneficiaries of livelihood assistance, formation of self-help groups for savings and credit. • Federating the associations for area-wide collectivization of agendas (e.g. DRR planning, development planning) as reference for engagement with government and/or civil society organizations. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intra-household interactions with family units • Pre-organization interaction between individuals and clans • CA partner and initial group of leaders socialize the need for organization (e.g. home visits, consultations) • In IP areas, CA partner consults with IP elders and local officials of NCIP • Individual and family decisions on joining organizations and participating in advocacy calls • Management of interpersonal and/or interfamilial conflicts affecting the integrity of organizations



Thesis 6

Disaster victims living in danger zones prefer to take disaster risks when they perceive that the consequence of policy risks (such as imminent demolition as a result of the NBZ policy) is greater than the consequence of a potential disaster.



This is a narrative of success in resisting a policy that has immediate and strategic consequences to disaster-affected families living in coastal zones.

with LGUs, and negotiations with private landowners to secure usufruct rights on land where the temporary shelters were relocated.

In April 2014, national government agencies such as the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), Department of Defense (DND), Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), and Department of Science and Technology (DOST) issued Joint Memorandum Circular 2014-1 also known as the 'No Build Zone' policy. The policy prescribes that the 40-meter space between the coastline towards inland should be cleared of structures.

In the ensuing debates and dynamics of power, the voice of the affected prevailed. The city government lifted the resolution and the national government suspended implementation of the policy in favor of finding viable solutions to the practical and strategic issues.

The 'Why' Question

In the dynamics between the State and affected communities over the NBZ policy, why did the State retract? Why and how did the resistance succeed?

The context is Yolanda and the immediate target of the policy was ground zero of the Yolanda impact: Tacloban City. Consequently, the city legislative council issued a resolution echoing the policy objective. But since NBZ is a national policy, it also created confusion nationwide. Not only informal settlers inhabit the NBZs, small enterprises, beach resorts, hotels, even LGUs, are located in the supposed NBZs.

Explanatory Factors

This was April 2014, barely five months after the disaster. Neither government nor local responders were ready to relocate affected families. Most of the early responses were about improving temporary shelters and restoring livelihoods. Ten HOAs collaborating with UPA and supported by the YRRP resisted the policy through collective action dialogues

- An ill-conceived and hasty policy could not be enforced for lack of other necessary conditions for it to be enforced. With the inability of government to fulfill post-Yolanda housing and resettlement promise, there is no way government could enforce the NBZ policy without resistance and possible violence.
- Affected communities in danger zones have the right to safe, secure, and adequate housing and resettlement. If there is no guarantee and, most of all, if there is a threat to loss of livelihoods and opportunities, they would prefer to claim the right to domicile where they are.

Interplay of Processes



Political

- In April 2014, the national government issued the No Build Zone policy without prior consultation with the affected communities and coordinating said policy with the housing and resettlement program for Yolanda victims
- Affected communities, the coalition of Yolanda Survivors, UPA and other NGOs launched protest actions coupled with dialogues with the LGU of Tacloban City
- In July 2014, the Sangguniang Panglunsod (City Council) of Tacloban City issued a Resolution allowing the construction of temporary shelters in NBZs.
- CA takes a precautionary stance arguing on the need for balance between rights and risks
- OPARR announces need to deconstruct NBZ policy into Safe and Unsafe Zones and the No Dwelling Zone (NDZ) in the Safe Zone
- DPWH announces plan for Tide Embankment; was met with resistance



Economic

- Affected families secure essential needs during the relief phase
- Affected families constructed and improved temporary shelters (later described as “temporment” a slang for temporary shelters that also serve as permanent shelters.
- Affected families recover and strengthen livelihoods in and around the danger zones
- Other affected families prepare for relocation



Technical

- No recorded technical processes in reforming the NBZ policy
- No recorded technical processes in understanding the implications of the ‘yes or no’ Tide Embankment
- Deeper examination of rights-and-risks balance not yet undertaken




Social

- Inter-individual and inter-familial interaction in regard to prioritization of beneficiaries for permanent shelter and relocation. The HOAs and UPA take lead in managing concerns and easing tensions.
- Among beneficiaries of permanent shelter and relocation: intra-household processes in allocating productive and reproduce roles in preparation for the relocation.
- Among beneficiaries in the ‘temporment’: intra-household processes in allocating productive and reproductive roles



Thesis 7

Disaster-affected communities in rural areas can also build back better according to humanitarian and housing industry standards and state regulation if provided with adequate financial and technical support from responders.



This thesis is derived from the experience of TAO, iCODE and UPA in the construction of permanent shelters or securing tenure of temporary shelters. Based on the experience, it is argued that disaster-affected communities can also build back better according to humanitarian and housing industry standards and that the government needs not solely rely on private firms to provide the services.

The backdrop of the story is the shelter component of the Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Plan (CRRP) for Yolanda, as announced in 2014. Then, the public pronouncement of the OPARR was to partner with the private sector as the only means by which large scale housing for Yolanda victims could be achieved. The plan was to construct 205,128 permanent housing units in areas affected by the typhoon. Fast forward to October 2017, only 38% of the targets have been constructed, of which only 12.79% had been awarded and actually occupied by beneficiaries.

The 'Why' Question

Government intuition suggests that large-scale housing and resettlement can only be done by private firms with experience in the housing industry. Why are disaster victims able to demonstrate that they can also build back better and adhere to standards?

Explanatory Factors





- Holistic approach to shelter; that shelter is not just a physical structure to replace the material value of what beneficiaries lost during the disaster

- Humanitarian aid framework that recognizes beneficiaries as capable human beings
- Availability of technical and legal resources
- Availability of land and the ability of responders and beneficiaries to negotiate usufruct rights on private land
- Beneficiary participation in the identification of suitable sites with DRR orientation, design of the shelter, procurement and mobilization of local builders
- The sense of dignity in being the owner not only of the final product but also of the process

While the selection of beneficiaries is initiated through technical procedures based on standard criteria, prioritization based on available resources becomes a political process where responders have to enable the voice of the affected, manage tensions, and partner with community organizations to arrive at acceptable ranking of priorities.

The overall interaction of beneficiaries contributes to norming and forming of community. Once all the shelter fundamentals are met, beneficiaries refocus on strengthening resilience of livelihoods, preparedness for disasters, and raising voice for access to essential services and economic support services from government.

Interplay of Processes

 Political	 Economic	 Technical	 Social
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participatory process in prioritization of beneficiaries • Beneficiary decision and commitment to provide counterpart resources • Beneficiary decision to own the shelter – from design, construction, and final settlement • Beneficiary family decision to transform the shelter into a home • Inter-beneficiary decision to build the settlement into a self-governing community with a leadership structure represented by the HOA. • Building power of the HOA and other organizations to make claims for delivery of essential services from government 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CA and partner secure funding for shelter, including co-financing arrangements (e.g. Manicani, Pope Francis Village) • Shelter beneficiary commits equity resources (labor counterpart) • Securing land tenure rights • Post-construction family re-investments in home improvement and optimization of space for food and livelihood needs (e.g. backyard gardens) • Post-construction community investments in maintenance of public facilities (e.g. WASH facilities, meeting halls, communal gardens, waste disposal system) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Selection of beneficiaries • Participatory design of shelters • Assessments (structural, geological) • Securing adherence to SPHERE standards, build-back better principles and state regulatory requirements • Dialogues and negotiations to secure land tenure rights • Securing legal requirements and permits • Trainings (e.g. procurement) • Procurement of materials and services (local builders/contractors) • Shelter construction (experts of CA partners provide technical supervision) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inter-personal and inter-familial interactions (cooperation and competition) in securing slots on the list of beneficiaries for shelter • On shelters in private land, beneficiary interaction with private landowner to establish good relations and gain mutual commitment on usufruct parameters • Inter-personal interactions (cooperation and competition) in choice of shelter design • In procurement, exchange of information on suppliers of materials and services • Post-construction social processes within the household/family in regard to home improvement • Interindividual and inter-household cooperation in building of the community with the HOA taking the lead in managing cooperation and competition



Programme Outcomes

Based on the YRRP Results Framework, the programme aimed to achieve outcomes in four domains: shelter, livelihoods, essential services, and local governance.



Shelter Assistance

Relief Phase
(Nov 18, 2013-June 30, 2014)

11,536 families received shelter materials (plastic sheets, ropes, coco lumber, plywood), cash for construction materials and shelter repair kits.

Rehabilitation and Resilience Phase
(July 1, 2014-September 30, 2016)

Support for transitional shelters was extended to 1,414 families (6,504 individuals) and progressive core shelter and permanent shelter to 255 families (1,173 individuals).

Beneficiaries affirmed the attributes of: adequacy, safety, security, and sense of dignity



Adequacy



Security



Safety



Sense of Dignity



Local Governance Assistance

Local Governance Assistance (Outputs) Delivered

- Local and national advocacy support for communities (8,750 individuals and representative organizations) in 189 barangays on policy matters affecting their lives.
- DRR/CCA (PVCA trainings and assessments, DRR planning, medium-term development planning, CCA/modeling of solar home systems)
- Community organizing
- Establishment of consultative mechanisms



Livelihood Assistance

Relief Phase
(Nov 18, 2013-June 30, 2014)

41,207 families (206,035 individuals) received food packs, supplementary feeding and food vouchers

12,137 families (60,685 individuals) received emergency livelihood assistance to 12,137 families (60,685 individuals)

Rehabilitation and Resilience Phase
(July 1, 2014-September 30, 2016)

- 10,816 families (54,080 individuals) received cash-for-recovery grants to increase food consumption and lessen exposure to protection issues
- Establishment of self-help groups/group-based enterprises (savings and credit, rice retailing, supply of feeds and organic fertilizers)
- Provision of post-harvest facilities
- Livelihood trainings



Essential Services Assistance

Relief Phase
(Nov 18, 2013-June 30, 2014)

29,728 families (148,640 individuals) in 247 barangays in 33 municipalities of 7 provinces in Regions 6, 8, 4B and Caraga (Northeastern Mindanao) received kits for hygiene, household cleaning and sanitation.

Rehabilitation and Resilience Phase
(July 1, 2014-September 30, 2016)

- 1,225 families (5,635 individuals) benefited from rehabilitation of WASH facilities
- 900 individuals supported in accessing maternal health services
- 1,251 children supported in getting back to school
- 5,443 women, girls, boys, elderly and PWDs received psychosocial and stewardship support services to reduce sense of fear and strengthen sense of safety and recover dignity

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